



Economic Growth Centre 





Impacts of Ageing Population on Monetary and 

















Economic Growth Centre 
Division of Economics 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences 




Website:  http://www.hss.ntu.edu.sg/egc/ 
Working Paper No:  2005/11 Copies of the working papers are available from the World Wide Web at: 
 












The author bears sole responsibility for this paper.  Views expressed in this 
paper are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Economic 
Growth Centre.  
Impacts of Ageing Population on Monetary  





Dr. Paul S. L. Yip, 
Associate Professor, Division of Economics, 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
Nanyang Technological University, 
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. 
E-mail: aslyip@ntu.edu.sg 
Fax: 65-6794 2830 




Dr. K. C. Tan, 
Associate Professor, Division of Economics, 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, 
Nanyang Technological University, 
Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798. 
E-mail: akctan@ntu.edu.sg 
Fax: 65-6794 2830 
Telephone: 65-6790 4781 
 






Keywords: Ageing Population, Central Provident Fund, Exchange Rate 
System, Monetary Policy, Singapore. 
JEL Classifications: F41, E31, E58.   1
 
Impacts of Ageing Population on Monetary  
and Exchange Rate Managements in Singapore 
 
Abstract 
  This paper finds that the ageing of the population in Singapore will cause a 
reversal of the current net Central Provident Fund (CPF) contribution into a substantial 
net CPF withdrawal from 2025, with a peak occurring at 2035. The result is qualitatively 
robust to changes in the underlying assumptions of the projection. The paper then 
highlights the implications of this change on the exchange rate and monetary 
managements in Singapore. First, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS)’s ability 
to influence Singapore’s exchange rate will be greatly hampered. Second, the net CPF 
withdrawal will mean sustained liquidity injection into (instead of the usual liquidity 
drain from) the economy. To avoid unnecessary inflation, the MAS has to find a 
sustainable way to mob up the excess liquidity due to the sustained liquidity injection. As 
a simple reversal of MAS’s current foreign exchange market operation will result in 
substantial shrinkage of foreign reserves, the paper proposes the issuance of government 
bonds to achieve the dual objectives of mobbing up the excess liquidity and avoiding the 
shrinkage of foreign reserves. This measure will also help the bond market development 
in Singapore. Finally, the paper proposes two other measures that can help maintain 
MAS’s influence on Singapore’s exchange rate to a reasonable level in the longer future.   2
1. Introduction 
This policy note first investigates whether the ageing population in Singapore will 
eventually reverse the current net CPF contribution into net CPF withdrawal some time in 
the future. It then highlights the complications of this change on the exchange rate and 
monetary managements in Singapore. In particular, it cautions that the MAS’s current 
ability to influence Singapore’s exchange rate may no longer hold if there is a substantial 
net CPF withdrawal in the longer future. It also cautions that the net CPF withdrawal 
could result in excess liquidity in the economy. Failure to recognize the need to mob up 
this sustained injection of liquidity could result in unnecessarily  high inflation. 
Nevertheless, a simple reversal of MAS’s current practice would result in substantial 
shrinkage of foreign reserves. An alternative measure is proposed to achieve the dual 
objectives of mobbing up the excess liquidity and avoiding the shrinkage of foreign 
reserves. Yet, there remains the need to find ways to restore MAS’s influence on 
Singapore’s exchange rate to a reasonable level in the longer future. This policy note 
proposes two such measures that can help restore MAS’s influence. It also indicates that 
other measures working in the same direction could also help achieve the objective.  
  The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 explains that MAS’s current ability 
to influence Singapore’s exchange rate is mainly due to the sustained liquidity drain 
arising from the current net CPF contribution. It then highlights that the ageing 
population could reverse the current net CPF contribution into a net withdrawal in the 
longer future (say, twenty or thirty years from now), and discuss the implications of this 
change to the exchange rate and monetary managements in Singapore. Sections 3 and 4 
will investigate whether there will be a substantial net CPF withdrawal due to the ageing   3
population in Singapore. Section 5 will suggest policy options to alleviate the 
complications on Singapore’s exchange rate and monetary managements arising from the 
problem of ageing population. The conclusions are in section 6. 
 
2.  MAS’s Ability to Influence Singapore’s Exchange Rate: Current and 
the Future 
 
According to the literature, the MAS can have a strong influence on Singapore’s 
exchange rate, mainly because of the net CPF contribution inherent in the CPF system 
and partly because of the persistent budget surplus run by the city state. As explained in 
MAS (1982/83), Teh and Shanmagaratnum (1992) and Yip (1996), Singapore has 
adopted the CPF system in which employees and employers are required to contribute a 
total of 30-40%
1 of the employees' basic salary into the fund. The net CPF contribution,
2 
plus the persistent budget surplus, has caused a substantial liquidity drain from the 
economy to the government sector. In order to avoid economic transactions being 
constrained by the liquidity drain and the Singapore dollar from appreciating too much, 
the MAS routinely re-injects liquidity back into the economy by selling Singapore dollar 
(and purchasing US dollar) in the foreign exchange market. By doing so, the MAS has 
been able to attain the dual objectives of accumulating foreign reserves for the 
                                                           
1 Before the Asian Financial Crisis, employers and employees in Singapore were each required to 
contribute 20% of the employees’ basic salary to the CPF. During the crisis, the government had reduced 
the employer contribution rate to 10% as part of the package to mitigate the adverse impact of the crisis. 
With the economy recovering, the rate was then revised up (to 12% and then 16%). Thereafter, there were 
reductions in the employer (and employee) CPF contribution rates due to reform in the CPF system to 
improve the competitiveness of Singapore and to alleviate the structural unemployment of the elder 
workers. From 2006 onwards, the (employer + employee) contribution rate will be (13+20)% for those 
aged below 50, (9+18)% for those aged between 50 and 55, (6+12.5)% for those aged between 55 and 60, 
(3.5+7.5)% for those aged between 60 and 65, and (3.5+5)% for those aged above 65. In addition, there 
will be an income ceiling of S$4500 per month for CPF contribution. 
2 As explained in subsequent sections, there are withdrawals for various purposes. However, the current net 
contribution is substantial when compared with the monetary base.   4
government and re-injecting liquidity back to the economy. Yip (2003) went a step 
further by highlighting that the liquidity drain due to the net CPF contribution
3 (and 
persistent budget surplus) has endowed the MAS significant influence on Singapore’s 
equilibrium exchange rate: 
With the substantial size of the liquidity drain, the MAS is effectively able to 
achieve a wide range of appreciations and depreciations by varying the 
amount of liquidity re-injection. For example, the MAS can achieve a higher 
appreciation rate by re-injecting less liquidity back to the economy. On the 
other hand, the MAS can achieve a lower appreciation, or even a 
depreciation, of the Singapore dollar by re-injecting more liquidity back to the 
economy.  
In addition, the liquidity drain is not only large but also a flow variable.
4 
Thus, the MAS could engineer, if it feels desirable, a sustained change in 
exchange rate (every year) within the wide limits allowed by the relatively 
large liquidity drain and the MAS’s capacity to print money. Such ability to 
change the equilibrium exchange rate has in turn increased the viability and 
hence credibility of the exchange rate system. In fact, it is likely to be more 
credible than a standard fixed exchange rate system that relies mainly on the 
stock of foreign reserves held by the government. 
                                                           
3 Yip (2005) further elaborated that Singapore’s persistent and huge current account surplus was closely 
related to the net CPF contribution which will ensure Singapore residents consuming less than what they 
are earning. As the budget surplus was small when compared with the net CPF contribution, the latter is the 
more important reason behind’s MAS’s ability to influence Singapore’s exchange rate. 
4 Consider an economy without such a flow “support” of liquidity drain but only a certain stock of foreign 
reserves. Attempts to appreciate its currency (by using its foreign reserves to buy domestic currency) every 
year would mean a sustained decline of foreign reserves. It is thus questionable whether such an economy 
could afford a sustained appreciation (through depletion of foreign reserves) forever.   5
Nevertheless, it should be noted that with the ageing population in Singapore, the 
net CPF contribution could be reversed to a substantial net CPF withdrawal in the longer 
future (say, twenty or thirty years from now). In fact, as reported in the website of the 
CPF Board, Singapore is having “a rapidly ageing population”. “Today, 10 economically 
active persons are supporting one elderly. By 2030, only 3.5 persons will be supporting 
one elderly”. If this official projection is not too far away from what is going to happen, 
there is a high chance that the current net CPF contribution will be reversed to a 
substantial net withdrawal some time in the future. By then, the MAS’s ability to 
influence Singapore’s exchange rate could be greatly hampered. Worse still, the net CPF 
withdrawal would mean sustained liquidity injection into the economy. Failure to mob up 
this excess liquidity could result in unnecessarily high inflation. To see these, first note 
that we have already assumed that the CPF Board will have sufficient money or assets to 
meet the CPF withdrawal. Nevertheless, having sufficient money to meet the withdrawal 
does not mean that there is no other problem. In particular, we would like to emphasize 
below that there could be macroeconomic management problems which have to be 
properly taken care of. 
First, the net CPF withdrawal will mean a sustained liquidity injection into 
(instead of the usual liquidity drain from) the economy. For example, when a retired 
person spends his CPF withdrawal for normal consumption or medical need, the money 
will be left in the economy. If left unattended, these sustained injections of liquidity 
would result in excessive inflation. To avoid the unnecessary inflation, the MAS has to 
find a sustainable way to mob up the excess liquidity due to the sustained injections. In 
other words, while there is definitely a problem if there is insufficient money to meet the   6
withdrawal, there will still be macroeconomic management problems if there is too much 
money circulating in the economy. One good example of the latter is the case of Hong 
Kong in 1986-97. As documented in Yip (2005), Hong Kong had made substantial 
earnings in the 1980s and 1990s due to the opening up of China. However, the substantial 
earnings had also caused excessive liquidity in the economy which had resulted in the 
building up of a relatively huge asset bubble in 1986-97. The latter had in turn pushed 
Hong Kong’s price and wage into highly uncompetitive levels and contributed to a long 
and severe post-crisis recession (i.e., more than seven years of high unemployment and 
underemployment rates between 1998 and 2005). Thus, avoiding the building up of 
excessive liquidity in Singapore arising from the sustained and substantial net CPF 
withdrawal is important. 
Second, the net CPF withdrawal will also hamper MAS’s influence on 
Singapore’s exchange rate. With the net CPF withdrawal, MAS will no longer be able to 
engineer an appreciation in the Singapore dollar by just reducing the amount of liquidity 
re-injection. Instead, it has to mob up the sustained and substantial amount of liquidity 
injection to the economy (arising from the net CPF withdrawal) before it can keep the 
Singapore dollar stable. If it wants to engineer a moderate appreciation (i.e., maintain a 
strong Singapore dollar policy such as that in 1980-97), it has to make extra effort in 
mobbing up the liquidity in the economy. Without the help of the liquidity drain due to 
the net CPF contribution, this will no longer be easy, not to mention the extra burden of 
liquidity absorption due to the substantial net CPF withdrawal.
5 
                                                           
5 As noted by Yip (2005), the more difficult part in the monetary authority’s influence is on the 
appreciation side. There is usually no limit on the extent of depreciation the authority can achieve. If the 
authority wants its currency to depreciate a lot, it can do so by keep printing money and spending it. Thus, 
the limit is usually the rate of appreciation it can achieve.   7
Thus, it is important to investigate whether the current composition and trend of 
the population in Singapore will lead to substantial net CPF withdrawal some time in the 
future. In the next two sections, we will make appropriate projections that will provide 
insights to this important question. 
 
3. Assumptions, Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness of the Projection 
Our projection starts with the benchmark population projection conducted in 
Wong et al. (2005). In this benchmark case, reasonable assumptions on the fertility rate 
and mortality rate were made with information from the latest population statistics (see 
the appendix for details). Following the usual practice of population projection, it also 
assumes a zero net immigration rate. As reported by the authors, the projection result is 
qualitatively robust to reasonable changes in the fertility rate and the mortality rates. For 
our projections of the CPF contribution and withdrawal, we intentionally choose the case 
of zero net immigration rate, mainly because we want to investigate what will happen if 
there is no assistance from the immigration policies. We then propose in section 5 that 
Singapore need substantial support in the immigration policies to alleviate the problem. 
With these assumptions, table 1 reproduces the benchmark population projection reported 
in Wong et al (2005).
6 As we can see, the projection shows that the resident population 
will reach a peak of 3.6 million in the year 2025 before declining to 3.3 million by 2050. 
Thus not only is the resident population rapidly ageing, it will also face the daunting 
prospect of a shrinking population size in about twenty years time. 
                                                           
6 We have also used other cases of population projection in our projection of the CPF contribution and 
withdrawals. Again, the severity of the ageing population in Singapore has made the qualitative result 
highly robust to reasonable variations in these underlying assumptions.   8
With the benchmark population projection, we then made projections on the gross 
CPF contribution and major components of the CPF withdrawals with appropriate 
assumptions (see further details in the appendix). We have also varied some of these 
assumptions and check whether the result is robust to changes in these assumptions. We 
find that the qualitative result of a substantial net CPF withdrawal in the longer future is 
extremely robust to changes in these assumptions. The main reason for this is that the 
problem of ageing population in Singapore is rather severe so that reasonable variations 
in these assumptions will not change the qualitative result. As a long list of scenarios with 
various combinations of assumptions will unnecessarily complicate the discussion with 
little value-added, we have chosen the following concise presentation of results. Out of 
the various probable and reasonable sets of assumptions, we first report the most 
conservative scenario (i.e., the one with the lowest projection of net CPF withdrawals 
over the years). To illustrate the impacts of changes in some underlying assumptions, we 
also report two probable scenarios (with higher projected net CPF withdrawals). As said, 
the qualitative result is robust to these three and many other scenarios. 
The projections for the three scenarios are reported in tables 2-4. To avoid 
unnecessary complications due to assumptions on the inflation rate, all the projected 
figures are in 2004 dollar value. As explained in the appendix, the projected gross CPF 
contribution has taken into account the reductions in (a) the CPF contribution rates and 
(b) the CPF monthly salary ceiling in the recent CPF reform. Because of the 
heterogeneous nature of the various major categories of CPF withdrawals, we have also 
made separate projections for each of these categories. The five categories are: (1) lump 
sum withdrawals upon retirement, W1; (2) withdrawals under the CPF Minimum Sum   9
Scheme, W2; (3) withdrawals for health care, W3; (4) withdrawals for housing, W4; and 
(5) withdrawals for other purposes, W5. 
 
4. The Projection Results 
The conservative scenario is reported in table 2. As we can see, Singapore’s 
projected net CPF contribution is rather substantial in the recent future (e.g., 2005). 
However, with an ageing population, the net contribution is projected to fall in an 
accelerating pace in the next twenty years. By 2025, the net contribution will be reversed 
to a net withdrawal. Thereafter, the net withdrawal will grow and reach its peak in 2035. 
Thus, the projected result suggests that there will be exchange rate and monetary 
management problems at least between 2025 and 2050. Furthermore, when compared 
with the monetary base (= 13324 millions Singapore dollar in 2004), the size of the 
constant dollar net CPF withdrawal over the various years will be substantial, suggesting 
the scale of the exchange rate and monetary management problems will be large.
7 
In the conservative scenario, the projection is made with the assumption that 
health cost will rise at the same rate as overall inflation. To check how the projection 
could be affected by variations in the assumption, we have also reported scenario 2 in 
which health cost is assumed to rise faster than general inflation by 2% for the next 5 
years before it rises at the same rate as overall inflation.
8 As we can see, the projected net 
                                                           
7 As the net CPF withdrawal will result in a rise in monetary base which will in turn cause a multiple 
expansion of money supply, the scale of the implied exchange rate and monetary management problems 
will be rather large. For example, the constant dollar net CPF withdrawal in 2035 could result in up to 
15.5% injection of monetary base in the economy. [Note, the percentage will be smaller when there is 
economic growth.] More importantly, this type of injections will happen every year at least between 2025 
and 2050. 
8 Note that it will be debatable, if not unreasonable, to assume that health cost will always rise faster than 
the overall inflation. Besides, the projected figures in the longer future will be highly sensitive to this type 
of assumption. In fact, we have tried that assumption and find that the projected net CPF withdrawal in the   10
CPF withdrawals over the various years are bigger than those reported in the conservative 
scenario. Nevertheless, the qualitative result of a reversal to net CPF withdrawal from 
2025, with a peak in 2035 is robust to the change in the underlying assumption. In fact, 
we have tried other assumptions (e.g., health cost rises faster than overall inflation by 1, 2 
or 3% over the next 10 years before it rises at the same rate as overall inflation). The 
qualitative result on the net CPF withdrawal remains robust to these alternative 
assumptions. 
In the conservative scenario and scenario 2, instead of making the assumption that 
all retiring CPF members will make their first lump sum withdrawal at 55 (which will 
result in a higher projected net CPF withdrawal), we have chosen the conservative 
assumption that the withdrawal will be uniformly distributed between the age range of 55 
and 59. To see how the projected figures could be affected by variations in this 
assumption, we also report scenario 3 with the less conservative assumption that all 
retiring CPF members will make their first lump sum withdrawal at age 55. As we can 
see, this has resulted in higher projected net CPF withdrawal over the years. 
Nevertheless, the qualitative result of a reversal to net CPF withdrawal from 2025, with a 
peak in 2035 remains robust. Along with this, we have also made other distributional 
assumption on the age of the first lump sum withdrawal (e.g., the amount of withdrawals 
decline linearly from age 55 to age 59). Again, the qualitative result is robust to 
variations in this type of assumption.
9 
                                                                                                                                                                             
longer future is unreasonably high. Therefore, we prefer to report scenario 2 in which the assumption seems 
to be more reasonable.  
9 We have also made some variations in the underlying assumption on the withdrawals for housing. Again, 
the result is robust to variations in this assumption. Meanwhile, assumption used in the three reported 
scenarios also sounds reasonable. Thus, for simplicity of presentation, we choose not to report results with 
variations in this type of assumptions. Finally, as the size of the withdrawals from the minimum sum and 
the withdrawals for other purposes are small when compared to other categories, reasonable variations in   11
Thus, our projection results have unanimously suggested that the current net CPF 
contribution will be reversed to a sustained and substantial net CPF withdrawal in the 
longer future. 
 
5. Policy Options 
As explained in sections 2 and 4, the substantial net CPF withdrawal will result in 
substantial increase in monetary base in the economy when the CPF withdrawers spend 
or save the withdrawn money.
10 This will in turn create multiple expansion of money 
supply. If left unattended, the substantial size of the monetary injection every year will 
lead to extremely high inflation in Singapore. Thus, the MAS will have no choice but to 
mob up the excess liquidity. One simple way to achieve this is to have a reversal of 
MAS’s current foreign exchange operation (i.e., buys Singapore dollars and sells US 
dollars in the foreign exchange market). However, this would mean that the government 
at that time needs to have the required amount of foreign reserves, and be ready to accept 
substantial shrinkage of foreign reserves for a prolonged period (i.e., at least between 
2025 and 2050). While the authorities will have more than enough foreign reserves to 
meet the above need, we do not recommend this as the shrinkage of foreign reserves for 
such a prolonged period could lead to undesirable psychological and expectation effects. 
Instead, we recommend substantial issuance of government bonds to mob up the excess 
liquidity. That is, we can avoid the reduction of foreign currency assets (i.e., the foreign 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the underlying assumptions on these categories have even less effect on the projection. Again, we choose 
not to report scenarios on this for simplicity of presentation. 
10 Even if the CPF withdrawers save the money in the bank account, the withdrawal will still increase the 
money base. With this injection of high power money, the bank can lend it out and hence create multiple 
expansion of money supply. 
   12
reserves) by increasing the Singapore dollar liabilities (i.e., government bonds). In 
addition to the advantage of avoiding the above shrinkage of foreign reserves, the 
measures can also stimulate bond market development in Singapore [see Greenspan 
(2000) and Jiang et al. (2001) for the benefits of a well developed bond market in 
reducing the chance (and mitigating the effect) of a banking crisis or stock market crash; 
and Yip (2004) for the benefits of bond market development on output and employment].  
Nevertheless, as highlighted in section 2, the substantial net CPF withdrawal will 
still hamper MAS’s ability in influencing Singapore’s exchange rate. One natural 
direction of solutions is to find measures that can reduce the CPF withdrawals and 
increase the CPF contributions. For example, an extension of the retirement age to, say, 
65 can (a) avoid  the reduction in CPF contribution; and (b) avoid (or delay) the increase 
in CPF withdrawal. As the extension of retirement age to 65 could result in substantial 
changes in the CPF contribution and withdrawal, measures along this line will be quite 
effective. In addition to restoring MAS’s influence on Singapore’s exchange rate, the 
measure can also substantially reduce the excess liquidity (implied by the net CPF 
withdrawal) and hence the required issuance of government bonds. 
Another possible measure is to increase the number of migrants at the working 
age and increase the (tax and non-tax) incentives for foreign workers to join the CPF 
scheme. This will alleviate the severity of the ageing population as well as the reduction 
in CPF contribution. Again, this can help restore MAS’s influence on Singapore’s 
exchange rate to reasonable levels and reduce the monetary management requirement of 
mobbing up the excess liquidity through, say,  the issuance of government bonds. In   13
general, policy measures that can increase the CPF contribution and reduce the CPF 




Given the rapidly ageing of population in Singapore, it is important to have 
thorough studies on the potential implications of this important factor to various aspects 
of Singapore. This will include not just preparing sufficient money to meet the future 
CPF withdrawals. For example, there should be well prepared plans on the projected 
needs for more health care, changes in demand for school places and teachers, and 
changes in demand for housing due to changes in the size and structure of the population. 
In this paper, we highlight the potential complications of an ageing population on 
macroeconomic managements in Singapore. We have illustrated that having sufficient 
money or assets to meet the net CPF withdrawal is not yet the end of the story. The 
substantial amount of projected net CPF withdrawal every year will result in excess 
liquidity in the economy. As the projected amount is substantial relative to the monetary 
base in Singapore, failure to recognize the need to mob up this excess liquidity will result 
in very high inflation in Singapore.
12 Thus, there has to be appropriate and sufficiently 
effective measure (such as substantial issuance of government bonds) to mob up the 
excess liquidity.  
                                                           
11 Although encouraging higher birth rate now could also mitigate the problem, it is not advisable to just 
rely on this policy. This is because the decision of having a child involves costs and considerations that will 
be far much greater than any possible tax incentives provided by the government. As result, the impact of 
the encouragement policies is likely to be small although effort along this line should be encouraged. 
12 If this ever happens and is not offset by sufficient downward movements in Singapore’s exchange rate, 
Singapore’s price and wage will be pushed to highly uncompetitive levels which could in turn create even 
more and greater problems in the longer future. Thus, the first best solution is to mob up the excess 
liquidity and avoid the possibility of subsequent series of complications or problems.   14
We have also explained that MAS’s current ability to influence Singapore’s 
exchange rate could be seriously hampered if there is substantial net CPF withdrawal in 
the longer future. We have also suggested two measures that can help maintain MAS’s 
future influence on Singapore’s exchange rate to reasonable levels, and at the same time 
reduce the required issuance of new government bonds. Along with these, we have also 
indicated the natural but important direction of policies that can achieve these two 
objectives: In general, measures that can increase CPF contribution and reduce CPF 
withdrawal can alleviate the problem. Nevertheless, as the amount of liquidity injection 
due to the projected net CPF withdrawal is substantial and is going to occur every year, 
there might not be sufficient number of effective enough policies along this direction. In 
such case, we may still need the help from substantial issuance of government bonds.   15
Appendix:   Further Details on the Projection Procedures of the CPF 
Contribution and Withdrawals 
 
 
Our projection starts with the population projections conducted in Wong et al. 
(2005). The population projection method is based on Lotka’s discrete-time population 
growth model (Rogers, 1975). The procedure is based on matrix operations where the 
population age distribution is multiplied by a projection matrix forward through time. 
The method takes into account the main determinants of demographic growth. The 
population projection of Singapore residents (i.e. Singaporeans and permanent residents) 
is based on data from the most current 2000 Census of Population. The projection allows 
for age specific rates of mortality. The benchmark population projection assumes the 
fertility and mortality rates are the same as those in 2000 (see Wong et al., 2005 for 
further details). However, the authors also find that the projection results are qualitatively 
robust to reasonable changes in the assumptions of the fertility and mortality rates. 
Based on the population projection, we made projections on the gross CPF 
contribution and the major components of the CPF withdrawals with appropriate 
assumptions. As highlighted in the main text, we have also conducted sensitivity analyses 
to check whether the projected results are sensitive to the assumptions. To avoid 
unnecessary complications due to assumptions on the inflation rate, all the projected 
figures are in 2004 dollar value. We have also taken into account the effects of the 
following CPF reforms on the gross contribution:  
(a) The CPF monthly ceiling was reduced from $5500 in year 2004 to $5000 in year 
2005 and to $4500 from year 2006 onwards; and   16
(b) The CPF contribution rates for various age groups were reduced (see footnote 1 for 
the details on the long term targets on the CPF contribution rates). 
Because of the heterogeneous nature of the various major categories of CPF 
withdrawals, we have chosen to make separate projections for each of these categories. 
The five categories are: (1) lump sum withdrawals upon retirement, W1; (2) withdrawals 
under the CPF Minimum Sum Scheme, W2; (3) withdrawals for health care, W3; (4) 
withdrawals for housing, W4; and (5) withdrawals for other purposes, W5. For the first 
two categories, CPF holders upon age 55 can withdraw their CPF savings, after setting 
aside their CPF Minimum Sum. They can also used their CPF Minimum Sum to buy life 
annuity from a participating insurance company placed as a fixed deposit with a 
participating bank or left in their Retirement Account with the CPF Board. From age 62, 
they will receive monthly payment from their CPF Minimum Sum to help meet their 
basic needs in retirement. If they have placed a fixed deposit with a participating bank, 
the associated money (i.e., the deposit) will be withdrawn from the CPF Board and hence 
increase the monetary base in the economy.  Thus, we have categorized this as part of the 
lump sum withdrawals in our projection. Meanwhile, retirees’ receipts from the life 
annuity scheme with the insurance companies should not and will not be included in the 
second category (i.e., withdrawals from Minimum Sum). For the third category (i.e., 
withdrawals for health care), we have incorporated the effects of an ageing population on 
the projected withdrawals. We have also done the projections with different assumptions 
on the rise in health cost (see the main text for details). For the fourth category (i.e., 
withdrawals for purchase of properties), we assume CPF members will on average make 
such withdrawals in the age range of 30-44. We have also varied this assumption by   17
extending the age range, for example, 30-49. Again, the qualitative result is not sensitive 
to variations in this type of assumptions. As the last category (i.e., withdrawals for other 








                                                           
13 With the previous reform in allowing part of the CPF money be used for purchase of shares, there was 
substantial amount of withdrawals for other purposes at the initial years of the reform. As this has stabilized 
to a lower value of withdrawal, we have made the conservative assumption that there will not be further 
relaxation on this category. It there is, the projected CPF withdrawal will be even bigger (at least at the 
early stage of the reform).   18
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Total number of 
Residents 
Number of residents in 
the age group of 20-54
 
Number of residents in 
the age group of 55-64 
Number of residents in the 
age group of 65 or above 
Number of residents in 
the age group of 30-44 
2005  3400  1868  322 289 877 
2010  3502  1831  445 341 764 
2015  3571  1764  539 446 682 
2020  3612  1651  589 570 648 
2025  3629  1579  564 710 685 
2030  3613  1509  512 822 686 
2035  3583  1484  438 894 671 
2040  3509  1463  385 902 618 
2045  3418  1422  404 847 595 












Table 2: Projected CPF contributions and withdrawals: Conservative Scenario 




































2005   4321  14327  10006  2396   359    794  6069  388 
2010   3818  13970  10153  3021    454  1005  5285  388 
2015   2985  13763  10779  3783    587  1300  4721  388 
2020   1428  13118  11690  4452    736  1629  4486  388 
2025   -336  12551  12887  4931   879  1946  4743  388 
2030 -1576  11920  13497  5237    973  2154  4745  388 
2035  -2067  11538  13605  5262  1031 2282 4641  388 
2040  -1820  11246  13067  5158  1009 2234 4277  388 
2045  -1559  11015  12575  5008    952  2109  4117  388 











Table 3: Projected CPF contributions and withdrawals: Scenario 2 




































2005   4321  14327  10006  2396   359    794  6069  388 
2010   3713  13970  10258  3021    454  1110  5285  388 
2015   2850  13763  10914  3783    587  1435  4721  388 
2020   1259  13118  11860  4452    736  1799  4486  388 
2025   -539  12551  13089  4931   879  2149  4743  388 
2030 -1801  11920  13721  5237    973  2378  4745  388 
2035  -2304  11538  13842  5262  1031 2520 4641  388 
2040  -2053  11246  13299  5158  1009 2466 4277  388 
2045  -1779  11015  12794  5008    952  2328  4117  388 













Table 4: Projected CPF contributions and withdrawals: Scenario 3 




































2005   4380  14327    9946  2336   359    794  6069  388 
2010   3778  13970  10192  2955    454  1110  5285  388 
2015   2845  13763  10918  3787    587  1435  4721  388 
2020   1043  13118  12076  4667    736  1799  4486  388 
2025 -1078  12551  13628  5469    879  2149  4743  388 
2030 -2557  11920  14477  5993    973  2378  4745  388 
2035  -3314  11538  14852  6272  1031 2520 4641  388 
2040  -3036  11246  14283  6142  1009 2466 4277  388 
2045  -2606  11015  13621  5836    952  2328  4117  388 
2050  -2224  10706  12930  5527    897  2192  3925  388 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 